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Dow Chemical Co. v. United States: Aerial
Surveillance and The Fourth
Amendment
I. Introduction
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,1 the Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, held
that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) aerial sur-
veillance of a Dow Chemical Company manufacturing facility
located in Midland, Michigan, was not a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment,2 and therefore, was not
subject to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.
This decision affirmed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
holding' which overturned the district court's' finding that
EPA had engaged in an illegal search because the agency had
obtained neither permission from Dow nor a warrant to search
prior to its fly-over, as required by the Clean Air Act (CAA)6
and the fourth amendment. The issues raised in this note are
whether the Supreme Court correctly ruled that EPA's aerial
surveillance and photography of Dow's plant did not violate
Dow's fourth amendment right to privacy, 6 and whether or
not aerial photography can be used as an inspection technique
under section 114 of CAA. 7 This note examines fourth amend-
1. Dow Chemical v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
2. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that peo-
ple have the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures" and that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
3. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd. 106 S.
Ct. 1819 (1986).
4. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982),
rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), af'd, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
5. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
6. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
7. Id. at 1824.
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ment law as it applies to searches in commercial settings, and
its relationship to the statute authorizing a regulatory agency
to investigate CAA violations. It concludes that although it is
vital for EPA to investigate violations in its implementation
of CAA, contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court but in
accordance with the dissent to that opinion," the fourth
amendment places limitations on the manner in which EPA
officials may investigate. In this case, EPA went beyond those
limitations by its aerial surveillance of the Dow facility.
II. Background
A. Dow Chemical v. United States
Dow maintains a manufacturing plant in Midland, Michi-
gan. EPA, in its efforts to enforce federal pollution laws, be-
gan testing emissions from Dow's powerhouses for possible vi-
olations. In 1977, EPA inspected Dow's powerhouses and
"requested and received, schematic drawings of the power
houses from Dow."9 Later that year, EPA asked to conduct a
second inspection, informing Dow that they intended to take
photographs of the plant layout and its facilities. When Dow
denied EPA's request for re-entry into the plant, EPA sug-
gested that they would return with a search warrant, but
never did so.10 Instead, in 1978, EPA conducted aerial surveil-
lance of the Dow facility "without further communication to
Dow".11
Approximately six flights over the plant were made at al-
8. Id. at 1827 (Powell, J., dissenting),
9. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich.
1982).
10. EPA never offered a reason why it was necessary for the agency to reinspect
the Midland facility. One can surmise that they had reasons to suspect violations of
the Clean Air Act, but did not have sufficient probable cause to obtain an administra-
tive warrant. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 105 S. Ct.
2700 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
11. Brief for Petitioner at 5. EPA contracted with a private company to photo-
graph the Midlands facility "to create visual documentation of smoke stack emissions
and to obtain perspectives on the layout of the plant and its relationship to the sur-
rounding geographic area." Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 310
(6th Cir. 1984).
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titudes ranging from one thousand two hundred feet to twelve
thousand feet.12 The Wild RC-10, a sophisticated aerial map-
ping camera,13 enabled EPA to obtain photographs that could
"be enlarged to a scale of one inch equals twenty feet or
greater, without significant loss of detail or resolution."14
When the resulting photographs were enlarged and magnified,
the images revealed "equipment, pipes and power lines as
small as 1/2 inch diameter."1
When Dow learned of the flights from "sources other than
EPA," the company immediately filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. 6 Specifically,
Dow requested that future warrantless aerial surveillance be
prohibited, that the surveillance which did occur be declared
an illegal search, and that the court determine if EPA ex-
ceeded its statutory authority in conducting aerial surveil-
lance."' Dow argued that the photographs did not illustrate
emissions from the powerhouses which was EPA's stated ra-
tionale for ordering the aerial reconnaissance photographs of
Dow's facility.18
The district court found that EPA had conducted an un-
reasonable warrantless search of the Dow facility which vio-
lated the fourth amendment.19 In addition, the court found
that EPA's method of inspection was impermissible under
section 114 of the CAA.20 EPA was permanently enjoined
from engaging in fly-over surveillance at Dow's plant.2
EPA appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the entire district court
opinion.2 2 The Sixth Circuit determined that "the photo-
12. Dow, 749 F.2d at 310.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1357.
17. Id.
18. Brief for Petitioner at 11.
19. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1357.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Dow, 749 F.2d 307; Brief for Petitioner at 5.
19861
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graphic fly-over did not constitute a fourth amendment search
and was not outside EPA's statutory authority"23 even though
EPA had admitted in its brief and at oral argument that they
had conducted what constitutes a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment.2' The court of appeals returned to
the basic question of whether there had been a search "trig-
gering the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. '25 The
court determined that even if Dow had an expectation of pri-
vacy from aerial surveys, the plant's "size and location mili-
tate against regarding an expectation of privacy free from ae-
rial observation as reasonable. 2 6 The court further reasoned
that the CAA and language of section 114 did not preclude
"enhanced aerial observation. 2 7
The Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit's findings.
Chief Justice Burger determined that the photographs taken
of Dow's facility were similar to those often used in map-mak-
ing28 and were taken in order to regulate Dow's activities, not
to appropriate trade secret information from Dow. The Court
further reasoned that section 114(a) does not limit EPA's in-
vestigatory powers, but rather expands its authority.2 "The
EPA, as a regulatory and enforcement agency, does not need
explicit statutory authority to employ methods of observation
commonly available to the public at large."30 Thus, the Su-
preme Court sanctioned the use of aerial surveillance and
photography as proper investigatory methods under the
CAA. 31 Next, the Court addressed the fourth amendment is-
sues and determined that Dow's fourth amendment rights
were not violated because the Midland facility was more like
an open field than curtilage observable by persons in public
airspace, and that photographs taken from this vantage point
23. Dow, 749 F.2d at 309.
24. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1358.
25. Dow, 749 F.2d at 311.
26. Id at 313.
27. Id. at 315.
28. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1823 (1986).
29. Id. at 1824.
30. Id.
31. Id. The dissent in Dow also agreed that aerial searches are permissible under
CAA. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
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did not constitute "a search prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. 32
B. Warrantless Searches and the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures has been extended to the commercial
setting.3 3 In See v. City of Seattle, 34 the Supreme Court de-
termined that a businessman in his work place, similar to an
individual in his residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon
his private commercial property. 5 The businessman loses this
right if an inspector can arbitrarily enter and investigate with-
out the safeguards provided by his having to obtain a
warrant.36
Warrantless searches, for both administrative and crimi-
nal investigatory purposes, generally are not upheld by the
Court unless the search fits into a recognized exception to the
warrant preference rule of the fourth amendment.37 The gen-
eral rule which emerged from the Supreme Court's holding in
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.38 provides that once governmental
action constitutes a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, the administrative agency must procure a war-
rant in order for the search to be lawful.39 However, warrant-
less searches are neither per se unreasonable nor per se pro-
hibited by the fourth amendment.' 0 While exceptions to the
32. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1827. '
33. See, 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment,
§ 2.4(b) at 338 (1978).
34. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
35. Id. at 543.
36. Two safeguards, provided by the requirement to obtain a warrant are a dem-
onstration of probable cause and review by a neutral magistrate. Id.
37. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499 (1978).
38. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
39. Id.
40. For example, warrantless searches are not unreasonable when police fear that
evidence is about to be destroyed or to disappear. See, Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966) (seizure of blood sample indicating high liquor content in suspects
blood can be taken without a warrant); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (seizure
of subject's fingernail scrappings without a warrant is constitutionally permissible be-
1986]
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warrant requirement are "specifically established and well de-
lineated,""' the courts have also held that warrantless
searches may be constitutional if deemed part of a regulatory
scheme and if the commercial property owner recognizes that
periodic inspections are necessary to fulfill that regulatory
scheme. 42 The threshold question to be examined is whether
the governmental action in this case (namely aerial surveil-
lance) was "sufficiently intrusive to constitute a 'search' trig-
gering the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. 43
III. Discussion
A. Does Aerial Surveillance Constitute a Search?
The majority of courts have held that warrantless aerial
surveillance requires no fourth amendment protection since
there is not a search." However, some courts have ruled that
the majority view may apply only to the surveillance of agri-
cultural fields.45 The difference between these two views stems
from the application of the Katz doctrine, 0 the test to deter-
cause of the ready destructibility of the evidence).
41. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1359.
42. There are exceptions to the general rule which provide for warrantless
searches such as the one for the mining industry established in Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594 (1981). Dewey listed the specific industries in which the pervasiveness
and regularity of federal regulatory schemes were sufficient to allow a warrantless
inspection program which did not violate the fourth amendment. Dow, 536 F. Supp.
at 1360-61. Besides mining, the industries include firearms (United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972)) and alcoholic beverages (Colonade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)).
43. See, Recent Developments, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 409 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Recent Develop-
ments]. This note will discuss aerial surveillance only with regards to administrative
investigations.
44. Id. at 410 n.7, 411. United States v. Allen 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D.
Mich. 1980).
45. Recent Developments, supra note 43, at 421. California Court of Appeals, in
particular, indicated in People v. Joubert, 118 Cal.App.3d 637, 173 Cal.Rptr. 428
(1981), that warrantless aerial surveillance may apply only to agricultural fields. See
also, Recent Developments, supra note 43, at 421. "[Flactory sites, outdoor swimming
pools, or sunbathing areas may be subject to Fourth Amendment protection because
they are 'areas expectedly private according to the common habits of mankind."' Id.
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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mine whether the situation in question is subject to fourth
amendment scrutiny.
In the landmark case, Katz v. United States, the Su-
preme Court abandoned the trespass doctrine as the basis for
determining fourth amendment violations." Instead, the
Court developed a two-part test to determine whether a pri-
vacy right had been violated which would implicate the fourth
amendment.48 Both parts of the test must be met before the
fourth amendment right to privacy arises. First, there must be
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy on the part of the
individual; second, it must be an expectation that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. 9
Thus, Katz allows a court, on a case by case basis, to de-
termine whether the fourth amendment was implicated. Invo-
cation of the fourth amendment depends on "[wihat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
fice ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected."50 Because the application of Katz is dependent upon
a factual evaluation of each case, and the particular court's
interpretation of Katz, the outcome of cases involving similar
circumstances may differ from court to court. The courts will
presumably reflect society's changing definition of reasonable
expectation of privacy, which is ultimately a value judgment.
In the context of environmental proceedings, this involves
weighing the value of an individual's privacy rights against
the value of the most basic natural resources - clean air, water
and soil.
The district court in Dow took a liberal view of what
would be a reasonable expectation of privacy, espousing the
minority view that aerial surveillance may be subject to fourth
47. The trespass doctrine was the test for standing in fourth amendment law
prior to the adoption of the Katz test for standing. The doctrine required that the
person asserting a fourth amendment violation have a "substantial possessory inter-
est in the premises searched." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
48. The Katz test was delineated in the concurring opinion by Justice Harlan.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 351-52.
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amendment protection because it is a search. Applying the
first part of the Katz test, the district court found that Dow
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy as to the interior
portions of its plant.51 The photographs taken by EPA "de-
pict[ed] internal regions of the plant in such vivid detail, ca-
pable of further enlargement and magnification as to defy
simply being described as views of the exterior of the facil-
ity." " The court continued by stating that the fourth amend-
ment does not require that Dow build a dome over its facility
in order to manifest an expectation of privacy.5 3 Rather, the
fourth amendment protects what one "takes reasonable pre-
cautions to safeguard.""'
The district court followed the reasoning of the Fifth Cir-
cuit in E.I. duPont de Nemours v. Christopher,55 for the sec-
ond prong of its Katz analysis, stating that "commercial pri-
vacy may be expected and exhibited, and may be deemed
reasonable and legitimate by society." 6 Dow had a legitimate
right to protect the design and construction of its processing
plant and should not be required to take extraordinary pre-
cautions to preserve its fourth amendment right of privacy.
Businessmen should not be put in the position of having to
choose between "taking extraordinary methods of sealing off
those premises or else submitting to unrestrained
surveillance. ,57
In concluding that society sanctioned Dow's expectation
of privacy, the court evaluated EPA's argument that the pub-
lic's interest in effective pollution control outweighed Dow's
right of privacy.5 8 However, they found that
[viery little pollution control utility [exists] in the investi-
51. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1369 (E.D. Mich.
1982).
52. Id. at 1365.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, reh'g denied, 401
U.S. 967 (1971).
56. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1367.
57. LaFave, supra note 33, § 2.4(b), at 341.
58. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1369.
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gatory method used by EPA in this case. . . Further-
more, it is difficult to place credence in EPA's assertion
that a goal of the aerial photography was to confirm ex-
cess emissions. EPA had little or no control over when the
photographs would be taken by Abrams, and no knowl-
edge of whether there would be any emissions at the mo-
ment they were taken."
In addition, the court found that the requirement to obtain a
search warrant was readily incorporated with the other as-
pects of planning surprise inspections." Based on the above
reasons the court concluded that the Katz analysis indicated
"that the EPA's aerial photography of Dow's plant consti-
tuted an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth
amendment.""'
However, the court of appeals adopted a more restricted
view of what constituted a reasonable expectation of privacy
and followed the majority view that aerial surveillance is not a
search. The court of appeals reviewed the lower court's deci-
sion by questioning the intrusiveness of EPA's aerial fly-overs
and photographs. While the court agreed that it was not nec-
essary for Dow to build a dome over its plant to insure its
privacy, it concluded that the size and layout of the plant pre-
cluded "an expectation of privacy free from aerial observation
as reasonable." '62 The court viewed the Dow plant layout as an
open field, an area not protected under the fourth amend-
ment.63 This rationale leads to the per se rule that:
[if] property is visible from the air . . . it . . . can never
satisfy the second prong of the Katz test .... Since most
open areas are visible from the air, the result of this per
se open view analysis is that open areas cannot receive
fourth amendment protection. Thus, . . . jurisdictions ap-
plying this analysis may conduct aerial surveillance un-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Dow Chemical Co. V. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1984).
63. Id.
19861
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checked by the warrant requirement.64
Adopting the per se rule in this case creates peculiar re-
sults. Dow maintained extensive security measures to protect
its Midland plant from unwanted and uninvited intruders. 5
Yet, despite use of these security techniques from ground
level and from above, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Dow
was not an open field from ground level, but was an open field
from the air.6 In its argument on appeal to the Supreme
Court, Dow pointed out that "having Fourth Amendment
rights at ground level is meaningless if a more intrusive ...
search method such as aerial photography is available without
restriction upon government agents. ' '67 The reasoning by the
court of appeals places the emphasis of "open fields" evalua-
tion on the type of intrusion rather than the character of the
premises. Whether a search is conducted from the air or on
the ground should not alter the court's determination of an
expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court, by a slim five to four majority,
adopted the per se analysis accepting the premise that one
can manifest a recognizable expectation of privacy on the
ground that will not be recognized in the air provided the ob-
server is in navigable airspace, even if using sophisticated sur-
veillance instruments. s The Court discussed the expectation
of privacy concept in terms of the "curtilage doctrine" and the
''open fields" doctrine.
1. Curtilage Doctrine and Open Fields Doctrine
Curtilage is a clearly defined area surrounding a home to
which fourth amendment protection is afforded. 9 Tradition-
64. Recent Development, supra note 43, at 422.
65. Included in these measures were procedures for reporting unidentified crafts
engaged in "multiple passes over the plant." Dow's security personnel were instructed
to report such planes and then to work with Michigan State Police for further investi-
gation. Brief for Petitioner at 6-9.
66. Id. at 16-17.
67. Id. at 21.
68. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 (1986).
69. Id. at 1826 n.3.
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ally, the area need not be enclosed, but usually includes the
buildings or areas used for family purposes and domestic em-
ployment.70 This area is given fourth amendment protection
because it is "an area intimately linked to the home, both
physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are
most heightened."'7
Beyond the curtilage lay what is termed open fields. Open
fields traditionally have been defined as wooded areas,
deserts, vacant lots, open beaches, reservoirs, and open wa-
ters.72 The concept was never limited to "its literal or techni-
cal definition of a place suitable for pasture or tillage. ' 7 3 In
Oliver v. United States,7 4 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
"open fields" doctrine which had been questioned by some as
being overruled by Katz.7 ' Oliver provided that "an individual
may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted
out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately sur-
rounding the home," the curtilage.7 6 The purpose of this rule
is to insure that
open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the [fourth] Amendment is intended to
shelter from government interference or surveillance.
There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of
those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that oc-
cur in open fields. Moreover as a practical matter these
lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in
70. State v. Hanson, 113 N.H. 689, 690, 313 A.2d 730, 732 (1973).
71. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812 (1986). Ciraolo, a criminal case,
was decided the same day as Dow. The court held that aerial surveillance of an indi-
vidual's backyard to obtain evidence needed to secure a warrant was proper.
72. LaFave, supra note 33, § 2.4(a), at 332.
73. Id.
74. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
75. The open fields doctrine, announced by the Supreme Court in Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), precluded the application of fourth amendment
protection to areas considered to be open fields. The doctrine, believed by some to
have been overruled by Katz was reaffirmed by the Court in Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170 (1984). "[T]he term 'open fields' may include any unoccupied or unde-
veloped area outside of the curtilage. An open field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field'
as those terms are used in common speech." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 n.11.
76. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
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ways that a home, an office or commercial structure would
not be.
7
In Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa,7 s the
Court applied the open fields doctrine in a commercial setting
and held that a state health inspector was able to conduct a
warrantless entry onto the company's grounds in order to
make emissions tests. The company's grounds were considered
to be an open field because the smoke emitted from the fac-
tory's smokestacks was visible by one not in the immediate
vicinity of the plant. While Western Alfalfa established a pre-
cedent for the legitimate entry of a government official onto a
commercial plant site to conduct tests,m the facts in this case
can be clearly distinguished from those in Dow. In Dow, the
entry was from the air and involved the use of sophisticated
photographic equipment that revealed information about the
plant that was not visible to the casual observer. In Western
Alfalfa, the warrantless entry occurred on the ground and the
emissions tested were those visible to individuals some dis-
tance from the plant. "The fundamental question is whether
this surveillance permitted the police [or agents] to see that
which the occupant justifiably believed was private." 80
The Sixth Circuit also found that even if EPA surveil-
lance of Dow was a search, a legitimate exception to the war-
rant requirement existed. The court looked to the "inherent"
77. Id. at 179.
78. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
79.
An inspector of a division of the Colorado Department of Health entered the
outdoor premises of respondent without its knowledge or consent. It was
daylight and the inspector entered the yard to make a Ringelmann test....
At the time of the instant inspection the state law required no warrant and
none was sought. Indeed, the inspector entered no part of the respondent's
plant to make the inspection.... The field inspector did not enter the plant
or offices. He was not inspecting stacks, boilers, scrubbers, flue, grates or fur-
naces; nor was his inspection related to respondent's files or papers. He had
sighted what anyone in the city who was near the plant could see in the sky
plumes of smoke.
Western Alfalfa, 416 U.S. at 862-65.
80. LaFave, supra note 33, § 2.3(g), at 329.
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test found in Donovan v. Dewey.81 The Donovan test balances
"the strength of the federal regulatory interest ...with the
reasonable expectation of privacy of the commercial
entity ... ." 52 EPA maintained such an exception should ap-
ply to CAA because of its regulatory nature. However, neither
the legislature nor the courts have ever determined that the
regulation of the chemical manufacturing industry is perva-
sive enough to create an exception to the warrant
requirement."
Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit, aerial surveillance
and photography was not a search. The district court con-
cluded to the contrary. What becomes evident from the analy-
sis of these two cases is that the inconsistencies in aerial sur-
veillance cases were very apparent and that the resolution of
this issue depended upon a ruling from the nation's highest
court.
The Supreme Court met this challenge by granting certio-
rari to hear the Dow case.84 It resolved these inconsistent
views, issuing clear direction in aerial surveillance cases. The
Court found that aerial surveillance of "outdoor areas or
spaces between structures and buildings of a manufacturing
plant"85 known as "industrial curtilage" 6 are not subject to
fourth amendment protection. However, this conlusion
strays from the firmly established precedents of See v. City of
Seattle, Katz v. United States, and Donovan v. Dewey.'8 In
See,8 9 as previously stated, the court afforded the same fourth
amendment protection to a businessman in his workplace as
to an individual in his home. The court in Dow, nevertheless,
broke with this precedent by distinguishing the nature and
size of industrial curtilage from curtilage surrounding a dwell-
81. Dow, 749 F.2d at 311 n.1.
82. Id.
83. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1361.
84. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985).
85. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1825.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1827.
88. See generally dissent discussion in Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1830.
89. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
19861
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ing place.90 If the business setting were to be treated the same
as the domestic setting for fourth amendment purposes, an
area surrounding the plant which was "intimately linked" to
the business would receive fourth amendment protection
under See rationale. Whether curtilage existed, then, would
be determined on a case by case basis. The Supreme Court,
however, eliminates the application of See by eliminating in-
dustrial curtilage from fourth amendment protection.
The Court also determined that a search, which might
otherwise be prohibited from the ground due to a fence, may
be proper if conducted from the air. Thus, the Court distin-
guished fourth amendment protection based on the manner in
which the search was conducted. This is contrary to the hold-
ing in Katz91 "which identifies a constitutionally protected
privacy right by focusing on the interests of the individual
and of a free society.' 2 Also contrary to Katz, the Court
looked for a physical entry to determine if there had been a
search.' 3 Yet, the Court in Katz overruled the necessity of
physical trespass for there to have been a search by conclud-
ing that the fourth amendment protected people, not places.' 4
The Court brushed aside the Donovan "inherent" test
and noted that anything which could be observed by the pub-
lic required no warrant.' 5 The Court never ruled chemical
manufacturing to be an industry so dangerous or pervasively
regulated that warrants were not needed. Nor did it conclude
that "a system of warrantless inspections is necessary to en-
force its regulatory purpose."'96
What emerges from the Supreme Court's opinion in Dow
is that future fourth amendment protection against warrant-
less searches has been severely restricted. To reach this con-
90. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
91. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
92. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1817.
93. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
94. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
95. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
96. Id. at 1830.
[Vol. 3
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clusion, the Court strays from the precedents and purpose of
the fourth amendment.9 7
B. Does Changing Technology Require an Expanded
Application of the Fourth Amendment?
Prior to Katz, an observer using equipment to enhance
his view was not considered to be conducting a search invok-
ing fourth amendment protection. This rule was based on the
proposition that the observer had a legitimate right to be in
the place from which he was observing.9 8 Therefore, "binocu-
lar observation while in open fields or unprotected area did
not constitute a search with in the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." e
However, after Katz the expectation of the individual be-
came the significant factor in evaluating enhanced viewing. It
could no longer be said that "an observation is not a search
merely because it was made from a vantage point where the
officer was authorized to be."' 00 Factors to be considered in-
cluded the sophistication of the equipment and what could be
seen in the normal line of sight "from contiguous areas where
passersby or others might be."10' Yet, the majority rule has
remained that "devises such as high-powered binoculars, tele-
scopic cameras, and infra-red telescopes only enhance what
could been seen with the naked eye and, therefore, their use
does not constitute a fourth amendment search."10 Still, an
ever increasing number of courts have concluded that "war-
rantless, technologically aided observations of areas within the
privacy zone [are violations of the fourth amendment] when
those areas could not be viewed with the naked eye."' 103
97. Id. at 1834.
98. LaFave, supra note 33, § 2.2(c), at 361.
99. Id. at 257. See, United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Fullbright v.
United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1968); Hudges v. United States, 242 F.2d 281
(5th Cir. 1957); People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 358 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1974).
100. LaFave, supra note 33, § 2.2(e), at 257.
101. Id. at 259.
102. Recent Development, supra note 43, at 426. See United States v. Allen, 633
F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980); United State v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977).
103. Recert Developments, supra note 43, at 426. See generally United States v.
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The federal courts of appeals have split in their opinions
on enhanced viewing using advanced technology. For example,
in United States v. Allen,"' the Ninth Circuit held that war-
rantless helicopter surveillance "aided by sense-enhancing de-
vises" of an individual's ranch was not a fourth amendment
search. 108 The court found that the defendant had no expec-
tation of privacy since "coast guard helicopters routinely
transversed the nearby airspace for several reasons including
law enforcement .... Any reasonable person ... could expect
that government officials conducting such flights would be
aided by sense-enhancing devices." 106 The court determined
that the controlling issue was the defendant's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.
Conversely, in United States v. Taborda,'0 7 the Second
Circuit employed the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis and concluded that warrantless observation con-
ducted with a high-powered telescope was subject to fourth
amendment protection. The court adopted a more widespread
application of the fourth amendment than did the Ninth Cir-
cuit, ruling that "any enhanced viewing of the interior of a
home does impair a legitimate expectation of privacy and en-
counters the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, un-
less circumstances create a traditional exception to that re-
quirement."10 Taborda's use of the word "home" does not
preclude applying this court's reasoning in a commercial set-
ting. The Supreme Court has held that fourth amendment
rights available to the individual in his home also apply to the
businessman at his place of work.10 9 In United States v.
Kim,110 the district court reasoned that if illegal activity is
suspected, a warrant can be obtained rather than "peer[ing]
Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D.
Haw. 1976).
104. 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980).
105. Id. at 1381.
106. Id.
107. 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. Id. at 139.
109. See supra notes 2-3.
110. 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976).
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into people's windows with special equipment not generally in
use. " This is especially true for administrative searches,
since the demonstration of probable cause necessary to pro-
cure an administrative warrant is less stringent than the re-
quirement in a criminal case.11 2 For EPA's purposes in Dow, if
EPA suspected that the company was violating emissions
standards, a warrant could have been obtained rather than
engaging in warrantless aerial surveillance of the plant.
It is clear that with advancing technological develop-
ments, the law regarding searches and seizures must mirror
those developments.113 As the court stated in Dean,"4 "judi-
cial implementations of the fourth amendment need constant
accommodation to the ever-intensifying technology of surveil-
lance." 5 Application of the fourth amendment must grow
and change and the courts must be prepared to deal with the
fourth amendment in new ways.
The courts cannot rely on antiquated interpretations of
the law and make them work in an unworkable situation. This
is what happened when the Supreme Court applied tradi-
tional fourth amendment constructs to the facts in Dow. The
Court refused to recognize that increased capabilities in sur-
veillance techniques allow searching in ways that cost, conve-
nience, and manufacturing techniques prohibit effective
protection.
IV. Is Aerial Surveillance Permissible Under the Clean Air
Act?
Ultimately, the legality of the EPA's actions under CAA
hinges on the resolution of the question whether aerial sur-
veillance is a search. Using a case by case approach, the court
must balance an enterprise's fourth amendment right to pri-
111. Id. at 1256.
112. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Public Serv. Co. of Indi-
ana, Inc. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ind. 1981).
113. Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1257. Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 112, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 585 (1973).
114. 35 Cal. 3d at 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
115. Id.
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vacy against the need for government regulation in a particu-
lar industry.116 If the privacy interest is deemed more impor-
tant, then a warrant must be issued by an impartial
magistrate. If the government's regulatory interest is greater,
then an exception is created to the warrant requirement. Dow
is one of the first cases to question the legitimacy of a war-
rantless search by EPA and to subject the EPA's inspection
authority to judicial review. 117
CAA section 114(a)(2) provides that
[Tihe Administrator or his authorized representative,
upon presentation of his credentials - (A) shall have a
right of entry to, upon or through any premises of such
person or in which any records required to be maintained
under paragraph (1) of this section are located, and (B)
may at reasonable times have access to and copy any
records, inspect any monitoring equipment or method re-
quired under paragraph (1), and sample any emissions
which such person is required to sample under paragraph(1).1 8
If entry is denied by the company, however, CAA does not
authorize EPA agents to forceably gain access to the prop-
erty.1" 9 The Act stipulates that the Administrator must insti-
tute a civil action to gain entry after being refused access. 20
That forceable entry is not contemplated by the statutes au-
thorizing EPA activity is significant. This means that EPA
administered statutes "compel EPA to go to court once entry
is refused.''2 However, the resulting entry must be accompa-
nied by a warrant based on probable cause less stringent than
that required in a criminal case. 22
116. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 311 n.1 (6th Cir. 1984).
117. Martin, EPA and Administrative Inspections, 7 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 123, 124
& 129 n.27 (citing Comment, OSHA v. Fourth Amendment: Should Search Warrants
be Required for "Spot Check" Inspections?, 29 Baylor L. Rev. 283 (1977).
118. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1982).
119. Martin, supra note 117, at 136.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 7414.
121. Martin, supra note 117, at 135.
122. Camara v. Municiple Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967); Public Serv. Co. of
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Barlow's becomes important if aerial surveillance is deter-
mined to be a search. If it is a search, then EPA has engaged
in a forced entry without a warrant. This violates the general
rule established in Barlow's"3 that a warrant must be ob-
tained for nonconsensual searches.12' If the aerial surveillance
is not a search, then no fourth amendment violation has oc-
curred and EPA is free to observe and photograph from the
air. Thus, the analysis under the Act is tied to the results of
the Katz test.
As noted above, the Supreme Court ruled in Dow that ae-
rial surveillance is not a search. Therefore, the warrant re-
quirement is not applicable even though one may dispute the
Court's application of the Katz test. However, the court also
ruled that section 114(a) permitted aerial investigatory con-
duct. The Supreme Court construed section 114(a) very
broadly. It determined that "EPA, as a regulatory and en-
forcement agency, needs no explicit statutory provision to em-
ploy methods of observation commonly available to the public
at large."'12 5 Thus, the Court's holdings broke new ground not
only by determining that aerial surveillance is not a search,
but also by determining that CAA permits warrantless aerial
surveillance as a routine investigatory method.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court, for the first time, has made clear its
position on aerial surveillance in an industrial setting - it
does not constitute a search receiving protection of the fourth
amendment. To reach its conclusion, the Court strayed from
precedent case law and interpreted a previously uninterpreted
section of the Clean Air Act. The Court acknowledged that
developing technology will alter and expand the methods of
permissible warrantless searches, but the Court is nonetheless
reluctant to address the need to alter and expand the protec-
tion of fourth amendment law to balance the capabilities of
Indiana, Inc. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 720, 725 (S.D. Ind. 1981).
123. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
124. Martin, supra note 117, at 136.
125. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1824 (1986).
1986]
19
296 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
this technologically sophisticated equipment. The effect,
therefore, is to limit fourth amendment rights altogether.
Regulatory agencies such as EPA certainly need to con-
trol offenders whose violations contribute to our increasingly
polluted environment. The Court does not, however, limit its
decision to aerial searches only involving the environment.
The Court's ruling has gone too far; it demands that we as a
society forego rights that are too precious to relinquish.
Diane Rosenwasser Skalak
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